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This article theoretically discusses Arlie Hochschild's (1983, 1998) concept of the ‘real’ and ‘false’ self
(1983: 194) and how this holds together her model about how it is we manage our emotions. Hochschild
draws on ideas about surface acting, deep acting and authenticity to support her theory of emotion
management. In this discussion I argue that these ideas undermine the clarity of the theoretical model
Hochschild tries to develop to explain emotion management. The first aim here is to demonstrate that
this concept of the real and false self acts as an unnecessary conceptual linchpin making Hochschild's
ideas about emotion management opaque. The second aim in this article is to theoretically engage with
Pierre Bourdieu's (1984, 1990) concept of habitus as a way of overcoming Hochschild's idea of the real and
false self.
Crown Copyright © 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
This article discusses Arlie Hochschild's model of emotion
management (1983: 35) and identifies inherent problems with her
use of the ‘real’ and ‘false’ self as a conceptual linchpin (Hochschild,
1983: 194e195). My intention is to explain these problems with
this emotion management model and offer an alternative for the
‘self’ that Hochschild describes by drawing on Bourdieu's concept of
habitus (1984, 1990). The real self is considered by Hochschild to be
the very core, or essence, of whowe are as a person, and in contrast,
the false self is ‘a part of “me” that is not really “me”’ (Hochschild,
1983: 194). My contention here is that there is no such thing as the
real or false self, nor is it important to make such a distinction.
Hochschild (1983) wanted to explain how it is that we can act
differently in certain social settings by managing our emotions. She
suggests that bymanaging our emotions we are able to work on the
self and present to the world a persona that is expected, and fits in.
Her model of emotion management was ground-breaking because
it helped to open up debate about the invisible and unrecognised
work people do in order to fit inwith social expectations (seeMann,
2004; Bolton, 2005). In this article I want to undo the dependency
on the concepts of the ‘real’ and ‘false’ self that is complexly boundevier Ltd. This is an open access arup in this model. In the first part of this article I deal with this by
showing howHochschild repeatedly draws on the real and false self
as a conceptual linchpin in her research (1979, 1983, 1997, 1998)
and how this makes her ideas inconsistent and opaque. In the
second part of this article I engage with Pierre Bourdieu's (1984,
1990) concept of habitus as a way of overcoming Hochschild's
idea of the real and false self.2. The inner self: real and authentic?
Hochschild developed a model (1979, 1983, 1998) to explain
how we manage emotion in certain social settings and around
certain people. This arose out of her research into flight attendants
working for Delta Airlines in the United States of America (1983).
Her research looks at how employees become who they are ex-
pected to be at work. Hochschild revealed that these flight atten-
dants were expected to act in a particular way at work to fit in with
the organizational expectations of the ideal female employee. For
these female employees this included being perceived as caring,
mildly flirtatious, and impervious to rude customers, as well as
dressing in a particularly feminised way that included a certainway
of wearing make-up, uniform and hair (Hochschild, 1983:
101e103). This finding in itself was revealing of constraints on fe-
male employees in particular (1983: 127e128). However, what
made Hochschild's work distinctive at this time was that sheticle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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managing to do all these things and become the right kind of
employee (105e106).
Before scrutinising Hochschild's emotionmanagement model, it
is worth briefly signalling how Goffman has influenced her early
work. Hochschild wanted to depart from Goffman's construction of
an individual that she argued is made passive to rules governing
interactions (1959; Hochschild, 1983: 225e227). She departs from
Goffman's ideas about the self as a collection of many roles and
performances because she is concerned with what she sees as a
lack of continuity. She argues that Goffman's account of reality
provides ‘no structural bridge between all situations’ (1983: 225).
That is e an explanation of how a person is the ‘same’ from one
moment to the next. She finds this problematic for two reasons:
firstly, because this would suggest that a person is governed by
social rules as a passive individual who has a lack of interiority. She
notes how Goffman seems to ignore times when an ‘individual
introspects or dwells on outer reality without a sense of watchers’
(1983: 226). Even though Goffman later explored to some extent a
person's inner world and their social context in ‘Asylum’ (1961), by
mainly focusing on the emotion of embarrassment, he does not
discuss the internalised feeling rules or capacity for agency which
Hochschild sees as being ‘“inside” the actor’ (1983: 226) and
fundamental to the management of emotion (1983: 228). For
Hochschild, then, it is this interiority and agency that is the ‘bridge
between all situations’ (1983: 225), and this brings her to the
notion of an inner essence e or real self. Secondly, she does not
think that Goffman properly accounts for how people are able to
use prior expectations to help navigate new situations. She criti-
cises him saying that there is ‘no overarching pattern that would
connect the “collections”’ 1983: 225). For her, ‘the idea of prior
expectation implies the existence of a prior self that does the
expecting,’ (Hochschild, 1983: 231). She provides this example:
When we feel afraid, the fear signals danger. The realization of
danger impinges on our sense of self that is there to be en-
dangered, a self we expect to persist in a relatively continuous
way. Without this prior expectation of a continuous self, infor-
mation about danger would be signalled in fundamentally
different ways (Hochschild, 1983: 231).
Hochschild (1983) is uncomfortable with the idea that a person
may be different depending on the stage setting and context. For
her, there is continuity in terms of how a person acts and feels and
that this is only possible because of an inner ‘real self’ (1983: 34).
She writes, ‘To develop the idea of deep acting we need a prior
notion of the self with a developed inner life. This, in Goffman's
account, is generally missing’ (1983, 227).
For Goffman, there is no such thing as real or false performances
signalling a true self. According to Goffman, all of our performances
are real in the sense that they simply take place e there is no un-
changing core that is the ‘real’ self, only an ongoing and increasing
personal portfolio of roles (see 1959: 252e253). However,
Hochschild (1983) identifies that an explanation of continuity be-
tween moments is under developed in Goffman's work. Goffman
did not write in detail about a reflexive or agentic self as such, but
the need to explain continuity between situations (as Hochschild
tries to do) is not, in my view, achieved through the ‘real self’ as a
conceptual linchpin, which I will now discuss further.
3. Hochschild's emotion management model (1983)
Hochschild's ‘Managed Heart’ model of emotions (1983) quickly
developed into a typology to explain how it is that emotions are
performed or concealed in certain social settings. She identifiedtwo different types of emotion management: emotion work and
emotional labour. Hochschild describes emotional labour as: ‘the
management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial and
bodily display; emotional labour is sold for a wage and therefore
has exchange value’ (1983: 7). Emotion work is slightly different to
emotional labour; as Hochschild states: ‘I use the synonymous
terms emotion work or emotion management to refer to these same
acts done in a private context where they have use value’ (italics in
original, Hochschild, 1983: 7; see page 181 in book for further
discussion). Hochschild suggests that we may undertake emotion
work in our day-to-day lives in order to present feelings in a more
agreeable way to friends, family and acquaintances, for example,
by hiding anger or embarrassment to preserve social relations
(1983: 19e20).
Hochschild develops her model by outlining the mechanisms
that make emotion work and emotional labour possible. She fo-
cuses on surface and deep acting (1983: 48e49). According to
Hochschild (1979, 1983), surface acting is a practice in which an
individual offers a performance that displays the expected feelings
they sense are in keeping with the feeling rules structuring that
particular social interaction, regardless of whether this is how they
feel or not. This surface acting of expected feelings, Hochschild
suggests, is an insincere performance that the individual hopes is
convincing to others, nonetheless (1983: 49). For instance, the
flight attendant smiles to show happiness; whether she actually
feels happy or not does not matter (1983: 127e128). To put it
another way, we portray or mimic what we think is expected of us
and conceal undesirable feelings. In short, Hochschild suggests that
what we are doing is acting out or mimicking the ‘shoulds’ accor-
ded by feeling rules that structure interactions, but we are not
obliged to internalise these feeling rules as our own (1983: 118).
Surface acting then is about knowing how to act in a given sit-
uation (1983: 48). This means knowing the implicit feeling rules
structuring workplace interactions. Knowing how to display emo-
tions is essential to being able to fit in within the workplace. To get
surface acting right requires some attention to the audience, usu-
ally a customer or co-worker, in order to discern whether the
emotional performance has been convincing to them. This is very
similar to how Goffman (1959) describes the dynamics of per-
forming a role during social interactions. The employee interacts
with the other person whilst trying to pick up clues that their
performance may possibly be viewed as unconvincing. The crux of
surface acting is to offer a performance that leaves the other person
convinced that they had a meaningful interaction. This person tries
to conceal from the other person that they were performing
emotional displays that were simply expected of them.
Another aspect of Hochschild's emotion management model
relates to deep acting. This involves a person trying to sincerely
embody an emotion so that displaying it for the other person is no
longer a fake but convincing performance and becomes ‘real’ (1983:
194). Hochschild describes deep acting as deciding ‘what it is that
we want to feel and on what we must do to induce the feeling’
(1983: 47). The person tries to make their emotional displays seem
authentic to themselves as well as the other person.
Hochschild goes further and describes the practice of deep
acting as working hard trying to feel a particular emotion. This
involves using emotional recall of memories of a situation where
the individual really had felt happy: this memory is then re-
visualised, invoked and attached to their present circumstances
to shape the mind and bodily behaviour. Hochschild states that by,
trying to feel what we sense we ought to feel or want to feel
(Hochschild, 1983: 43) we must undertake deep acting, this
activity of working on emotions at a ‘deep level’ so that they are
felt as ‘real’ is accomplished via a process of imagining, that is, to
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if this were true (1983: 43).
Hochschild suggests that by inducing an imagined emotion via
deep acting, the self will come to accept it as authentic and part of
the real self. Deep acting requires that the individual suspends their
‘usual reality testing’ and instead ‘allow a make-believe situation to
seem real’ (Hochschild, 1983: 42), in the hope that it will take on
the qualities of being real at a later stage.
Deep acting is not only used to theorise the inducement of
imaginary feelings in Hochschild's framework, but it is also used to
refer to how an individual might prevent a real feeling from
emerging from the depths of the real self and mis-fitting the situ-
ation. Hochschild uses her concept of deep acting to explain how
the individual attempts to convince themselves that they really feel
something else other than what they are feeling, or else ‘block or
weaken a feeling we wish we did not have’ (Hochschild, 1983: 43).
Deep acting then involves ‘bad faith’ (Hochschild, 1983: 47), which
is a problematic concept that suggests that individuals can inten-
tionally deceive themselves. A person would have to know that
they were trying to forget something that they know. For Hochs-
child, deep acting is also about lying to ourselves, but the lie is
suppressed in the hope that the lie will disintegrate and the
deception we began with will take the form of something real.
Whilst Hochschild describes the practice of deep acting she is
not clear or convincing about the purpose of deep acting. Hochs-
child tries to convince us that the point of deep acting is to make a
feeling that is imagined seem real, so that it becomes real.4. Confusing concepts
Hochschild presents an array of interesting concepts as part of
her model of emotion management (1998, 2003). She offers a way
to theorise deep acting but is never quite clear about what it is,
what the purpose of deep acting is, or how it is done. Instead, she
offers numerous examples that she suggests demonstrate deep
acting and often relies upon the reader to intuitively know what
deep acting is, how it is done, and why.
Deep acting is necessitated in Hochschild's study because she
senses that there are times when people do not feel as though they
fit in as they are in certain situations. People are motivated to do
deep acting to bring mis-fitting feelings more in line with what is
expected in a given social situation and transforming them. Deep
acting is unnecessarily complicated, however, by Hochschild's
discussion of real feelings and false feelings. Deep acting tries to
explain how a person can knowingly hold two (or more) contra-
dictory feelings in place e neither has to be real or false. This
perception of real or false feelings, I would suggest, arises out of a
calculation the person makes about some feelings ‘fitting in’ with
the social space they are in, and other feelings being viewed as mis-
fitting. These mis-fitting feelings are concealed, although not
forgotten, because they do not fit in case they might incur a social
sanction. Holding these contradictions in place can be painful for an
individual. We do deep acting because we want to fit in within the
dominating structures of feeling. The desire to fit in is what I would
suggest motivates deep acting, despite it being a painful thing to do.
Therefore, the idea of real or false feelings is rather a distinction a
personmakes about the kind of feelings that fit in and those that do
not.
Deep acting is painful precisely because it is work on the self
that forces an adjustment to who we are told we ‘ought’ to be or
how we ‘should’ feel, and recognition that we do not presently
embody this already. It feels strange also to act in a way that we are
not used to. Put another way, taking on someone else's rules togovern our own emotions and behaviour makes us feel odd, ill at
ease, and it feels wrong whenwe try to convince ourselves that this
is our normal, everyday behaviour and way of feeling. Deep acting
can make us feel anxious because it is hard to do, and yet oddly
enough it can also help to reassure us that at least we fit in better in
certain social spaces by doing it.
This process of ‘becoming’ who we sense we should be, by
making painful adjustments, is rife with tension and anxiety. Deep
acting is painful and invokes tensions becausewe harbour thoughts
that we should already be that person we are trying to become.
What is more, there is an on-going debasement directed at the self
for having to undergo deep acting in the first place. A painful ten-
sion arises when we undertake deep acting because we think we
shouldn't have to try so hard to feel a certain way, to be a certain
kind of person, we want to be that person already to feel a certain
way already. Having to labour at it is a clear sign that we are not the
person we feel we ought to be, we do not know what to feel. The
pain of doing deep acting may ease over time though as one way of
feeling is replaced by another perhaps more socially desirable way,
and is assimilated as if it were already our ownway of thinking and
feeling.
Tonkens (2012) also makes a similar argument, suggesting that
Hochschild does not sufficiently clarify what she means by partic-
ular concepts and what they are supposed to do. Tonkens too is
critical of Hochschild's lack of connections between her concepts
and how they are supposed to relate to each other in this emotion
management model. In Hochschild's explanations of deep acting,
for instance, she tends to jump from talking about deep acting as
being about making false performances of feelings feel authentic
(1983: 35e36), then to how deep acting is also about suppressing
real feelings, and then she moves to a different theme altogether
within deep acting inwhich the individual is also trying to preserve
the real self (an inner jewel) (1983: 34) and manage the false self
(1983: 195). Even after this extensive use of deep acting as a form of
emotional labour/work, she theorises deep acting as also including
the practice of conscious and continuous self-deception in which
the real self is fooled by an illusion which they have deceived
themselves into believing (1983: 40e42). It is difficult to untangle
what Hochschild means exactly by deep acting and what it is
supposed to do precisely, and the reason for this is because she tries
to make the concept account for too much within her theoretical
framework.
Hochschild is trying to use deep acting as a conceptual device
that explains how we try to make ‘who we are not’ (what she sees
as the false performances) become ‘who we are’ (part of the real
self). Deep acting is a mechanism that she uses to explain how we
try to become a person with particular feelings because of a sense
that this is who we ought to be and how we ought to feel. Deep
acting then is a form of emotional labour/work that has the purpose
of becoming someone else in order to fit inwith already structured
expectations and rules. It is necessary to her theoretical framework
that she is able to justify a distinction between the real and false self
because she argues that it is the real self that is being exploited by
capitalist organizations (1983: 34; see also Fineman, 2008). I
discuss this separation of the real and false self shortly and how it is
particularly problematic in her work, and hence why I bring in
Bourdieu's idea of the habitus (1984) to resolve it.
5. The ‘real’ and ‘false’ self: a misleading conceptual linchpin
When Hochschild talks about a real self she is describing a self
that has honest and true feelings that are not subject to pretence or
acting. For her, the real self constitutes a continuity, an embodied
way of being and doing that is predictable and recognisable to
others. Possessing a ‘real self’ tells others what we are like as a
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real self to an inner jewel or essence that makes us who we are. To
do this, she sets up an agentic, choosing individual with an
internalised sense of continuity: a real self. The real self is a formed
identity that is reliably the same, from day-to-day, and it is in our
possession to control.
In this sense then, I would argue that Hochschild mistakenly
interprets the anxiety that arises out of trying to become someone
we sense we ‘should’ be as evidence of a separation between a real
and false self e for example, ‘I wasn't really being myself’
(Hochschild, 1983: 262). And yet, this is based on the person's
perception of what is real and false, and a sense of a core self. She
uses these dispositions to evidence a ‘real self’ and ‘an inner jewel
that remains our unique possession no matter whose billboard is
on our back […] we push this “real self” further inside, making it
more inaccessible’ (1983: 34). What is missing then is a distinction
and reflection made between how the individual sees themselves,
and how the self is being socially constructed in these narratives
through dispositional histories.
Working on an emotion so that it fits inwith the social space the
individual is in can be painful. Hochschild argues the more we have
to work on ourselves to become comfortable with representing an
emotion we think we ought to feel, the more inauthentic the
emotions we are trying hard to embody become, and therefore we
find ourselves getting further away from our real selves. She writes
that ‘subtracting credibility from the parts that are in commercial
hands, we turn towhat is left to find out whowe “really” are’ (1983:
34). Hochschild further argues that backstage is where the ‘real self’
can supposedly relax and emerge, and that it is in this space that
more authentic performances occur rather than during front stage
performances, which tend to be around customers and clients
(1983: 192). Erickson (2011:121) notes how there has been
increased attention around the idea of authenticity and ‘the real
thing’ in a post-industrial climate. Cain's research (2012) looks at
authenticity and the emotional labour of workers in practice at a
care hospice in North America and it challenges Hochschild's idea
of a split real and false self. Cain argues that this was not the case in
her research and instead shows howworkers felt that how they act
around their patients is just as authentic and real as their behaviour
in the staff room. These workers felt that they presented a more
formalised and different ‘hospice identity’, rather than a ‘false self’
which Hochschild would suggest. In Cain's research this worker
identity was important to how the participants' felt they should
manage their own emotions at work.
Hochschild is engaging in a phenomenological debate about a
person's state of being in the world. She is advocating the notion of
a real person, with real feelings, that possesses an alter ego which
she describes as the ‘false self’ (1983: 194), which creates illusions
andmake believe that fool the real self. This false self is described as
‘a disbelieved, unclaimed self, a part of “me” that is not “really me”’
(1983: 194). According to Hochschild, the difference between what
is the real self and what is false depends on what aspects of it we
claim, so for instance, we may say ‘I wasn't really being myself at
that party’. For Hochschild, we each possess a real self, or inner
essence that we know to be true (1983: 34): the critique I am
making here is that Hochschild's concept of the real/false self re-
quires more critical engagement with why a person might feel that
way about their identity.
6. Exploitation of the ‘real’ self: autonomy and agency
Hochschild needs the concept of a ‘real self’ with a ‘real life’
(1983: 47) in her theoretical framework to explain what she sees
as the exploitation of a person's inner essence by capitalist orga-
nizations. Hochschild is suggesting that being made to becomesomeone else who is ‘other’ to us at work, and being told how to
feel according to structured feeling rules, is a suppression of an
individual's core self and their agency. So, feeling pressured to
change because of feeling rules makes us shape our sense of self in
a way that we do not necessarily do out of choice in the work-
place, and in ways we are not necessarily accustomed to or feel
comfortable with. Hochschild says, ‘The airline passenger may
choose not to smile, but the flight attendant is obliged not only to
smile but to try to work up some warmth behind it’ (1983: 19).
Hochschild is concerned with how the transmutation of emotion
work, that is, a personal choice to work on the self to become
someone we feel we ought to be for others in our private lives, is
exploited by capitalist organization and given an exchange value.
This exploitation amounts to a suppression of the real self.
Hochschild therefore needs to set up this construct of the
authentic, agentic individual to justify her argument that capitalist
organizations are exploitative of emotional labour and emotion
work.
Many workers have little choice but to work on themselves it
would seem, although this is not true of all workers who can ex-
ercise power to negotiate workplace feeling rules (1983: 19, 89). For
the most part, it is concerning to Hochschild that workers poten-
tially lose their capacity to freely display how they feel. This ca-
pacity to show feelings is relinquished by the employee as part of
the expectations of their contract and instead they must internalise
workplace feeling rules if they want to get paid.
She constructs the exploitation of a person's emotional system
by capitalism, that is, the transmutation of emotion work into
emotional labour, as an immoral act that infringes on the nobility
and sanctity of a ‘real self’ (1983: 34). Referring to a real self,
Hochschild draws upon Rousseau's ‘Noble Savage’ (1983: 192) to
describe a person who is not subjected to any feeling rules, who
feels spontaneously and without calculation. This real self is to be
valued, protected and preserved, according to Hochschild, from the
onset of capitalism and the demands of emotional labour, lest we
become a ‘faceless soul beneath the mask’ (1983: 194). Hochschild
needs to explain this act of exploitation, specifically of emotion, via
an idea of valuing a real self (1983:192) which she sees as
increasingly constricted by rules, deeply entwined in the matrix of
capitalism, with little choice but to exchange an inner self and
emotions for a wage.
Bolton (2005: 39) is critical of Hochschild's theory of emotion
management, saying that it ‘restricts the possibility of individuals
ever being active agents, who through negotiation are able to break
the “chain” of power and “make their own histories”’. Furthermore,
Bolton is opposed to the idea that employees are coerced to align
themselves with organizational rules and lose a ‘sense of self in the
process’ (2005: 39). Instead, Bolton argues for a model of a person
who reflects the modern, reflexive individual (Bolton, 2005; Bolton
and Boyd, 2003; Giddens, 1991, 1994; Urry, 2000; Beck, 1992, 1994;
see Atkinson, 2010, 2012; and Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Du
Gay, 1996). That is, someone who is able to navigate, negotiate
and overcome feeling rules that have the capacity to constrain
employees. She is suggesting then that employees can choose how
to feel at work to a greater extent thanwhich Hochschild allows for
within her theoretical framework. According to Bolton, Hochschild
is suggesting that capitalist organizations have:
Appropriated all of our feelings so that there is no longer any
room for sentiments, moods or reactions that have not been
shaped and commodified via the ‘commercialization of intimate
life’ (Bolton, 2005: 2).
Bolton suggests that Hochschild's argument e that intimate life
is increasingly commercialized through emotional labour e
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(Bolton, 2005: 48). Based on her own research into caring work,
Bolton finds Hochschild's concept of emotional labour lacking
depth because she says that it only describes one particular kind of
emotion management relative to the service sector (i.e. that emo-
tions are the product that is sold). For Bolton, some emotions are
freely given as part of social relations during interactions with
others. Bolton identifies here then that Hochschild's concept of
emotion work is under-developed. We do not always work on
emotions at work because it is exchanged for a wage e sometimes
working on emotions can be useful as part of social relations. So for
instance, some employees that Bolton studied in the care industry
(Bolton, 2000, 2005; Bolton andMuzio, 2008; see also, Mann,1999)
use their emotions to facilitate their interactions with others, but
their emotions are not what is being sold. Bolton sees Hochschild's
concept of emotional labour as having too narrow a focus on cap-
italism and puts forth her own typology of emotion management:
‘pecuniary’ with ‘prescriptive’, which relate to instrumental per-
formances of emotion in the workplace rooted in economic and
status gain and are empty of feeling; as well as ‘presentational’
emotion management, which refers to the ‘basic socialized self’
(Bolton and Boyd, 2003: 297), and ‘philanthropic’, which is an
intentional and freely chosen act of giving emotion to customers
and co-workers that are not prescribed by workplace feeling rules.
In this sense, according to Bolton, workers seek these ‘unmanaged
spaces’ (2005: 102) in order to express their true and ‘authentic’
selves.
I agree with Bolton when she says that there is more to
emotion management at work than just exchanging emotions for a
wage. But Hochschild acknowledges this, too e she just doesn't
advance this area of her research. She does write briefly about
emotion work as a theoretical concept, which addresses how
people manage emotion in their personal social relations, and how
this act has use value (Hochschild, 1983: 7; see page 181 in book
for further discussion). It is true that this is particularly under-
developed. I suspect that Hochschild would agree with Bolton
that people work on their emotions at work for the purposes of
maintaining social relations but that capitalist organizations are
slowly starting to encroach on this kind of emotion management,
threatening the ‘real self’, to advance their own strategies and
agendas.
Bolton's assessment of Hochschild criticises her emotion
management model for constructing a ‘crippled actor’ who is
overly constrained by feeling rules in the workplace. Bolton
instead contends that her studies show the opposite, that em-
ployees actively choose how to follow workplace feeling rules
(2003) and retain control over managing their emotions. However
Bolton's criticism is incorrect e the actor is not ‘crippled’ yet;
Hochschild is warning about this being a possibility if capitalist
organizations are permitted to commodify emotion management.
Hochschild is trying to preserve the idea of free will and agency,
that is, the intentional and choosing individual, just as much as
Bolton. What Bolton appears to be arguing is simply a matter of
degree e the degree to which an individual's agency to negotiate
structured feeling rules is (un)constrained at work. Hochschild is
not describing someone who is without agency, only that this
agency is tightly managed in the workplace and that this could get
worse.
Both Hochschild and Bolton's approaches to emotion manage-
ment still rely on the idea of an authentic, choosing individual, in
short, a true self. Just as Bolton has criticised Hochschild for creating
an individual with no agency, I too would criticise Bolton for con-
ceptualising an individual with too much agency, drawing on the
words of Brook, for ‘claiming a form of supra-autonomy for emotion
work’ (Brook, 2009: 540).7. The problem with the ‘real’ self
What is missing from both Hochschild's (1983) and Bolton's
(2005) theoretical framework is a way of explaining how the in-
dividual interacts with structured feeling rules that does not rely on
a true or real self. The main criticism that is generally levelled at
theories that are based on the notion of a real self with an intan-
gible core is that it constructs a wholly agentic and reflexive indi-
vidual (Bolton, 2005; Bolton and Boyd, 2003; Giddens, 1991, 1994;
Urry, 2000; Beck, 1992, 1994) who is able to stand outside of social
structure (Bourdieu, 1984).
What is needed to resolve the problems that arise out of cen-
tring theory on a real self is a way to overcome the antimony be-
tween the personal and the social, and structure and agency. To put
it another way, a conceptual bridge between themind and the body
is needed to better explain how emotion management occurs.
Tonkens (2012) also identifies this problem in Hochschild's work
(1979, 1983, 1998, 2003). Tonkens argues that, ‘There is a theoret-
ical lacuna in Hochschild's work on how relationships between
individual emotions, social interactions, and large-scale processes
like globalization and commercialization relate to one another’
(2012: 196). She suggests that Hochschild struggles to overcome
the analytical gap between core micro concepts and macro level
concepts.
8. Bourdieu and habitus
I want to suggest that Bourdieu (1984) offers a more fruitful way
of explaining continuity across moments (which Hochschild at-
tempts to do by drawing on the notion of a real self) in his theory of
the self as embodied history. Bourdieu describes that a person's
embodied history is the accrual of memories and knowledge that
are embedded as dispositions (1984). This conceptual device is
described by Bourdieu as a person's habitus (1984). A person's
habitus disposes a person to think, feel and act in ways that are the
outcome of their ‘conditions of existence’ (Bourdieu, 1990: 52). The
habitus then is formed out of ‘systems of durable, transposable
dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as
structuring structures’ (Bourdieu, 990: 53). This means that a per-
sonwill feel in away that is shaped by ‘generative principles’ (1990:
53) that provide a structure and logic with ‘no active conscious
intent’ (Addison, 2016). This means that a person is a product of
history and their particular moment in time, and as such delineates
relationality across structure and agency.
Using Bourdieu's concept of the habitus it is possible to think
about the self more as a unique set of embodied dispositions that
we use to strategize our actions and our feelings. This means that
there is no need to think of the self as an intangible core or a real
self that can be criticised for a ‘supra-autonomy’ (Brook, 2009: 540)
that exists outside of social structure (Barbalet, 2001, 2002).
Moreover, the notion of a ‘real self’ that emerges in Hochschild's
interviews with flight attendants (e.g. ‘I was not being myself’) is
much better framed as a discussion about reflexivity, in two ways:
firstly, on an epistemological level e this involves scholars ‘ being
reflexive regarding how knowledge is generated, produced, rep-
resented and legitimated’ (Addison, 2016: 18; see also Bourdieu and
Wacquant, 1992); and secondly, by critically engaging with how the
individual is being reflexive about themselves in the world (Skeggs,
2002) and builds a narrative around this (Lawler, 2008). Whilst
some individuals may feel they possess an inner self that is real and
authentic, I argue that this is a perception that Hochschild does not
sufficiently interrogate.
Hochschild used the concept of the real and false self in her
model of emotions. In contrast, I want to draw on Bourdieu to argue
that we use dispositions as knowledge of how to act and feel in
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tantlymanage, our emotions. Using this model of the self avoids the
criticism directed at Hochschild that individuals are overly struc-
tured by feeling rules (Bolton, 2005), as well as the criticism lev-
elled at Bolton (2005) by Brook (2009) that individuals are able to
stand outside of structure and seek out ‘unmanaged spaces’
(Bolton, 2005: 102) as agentic and autonomous individuals.
Moreover, Bourdieu suggests that we are all already born into
social games that have started without us. We are immersed in the
social world and acquire dispositions as we grow that orient us to
the correct way to do things in certain social spaces and around
different people. We grow accustomed to the different rules and
principles that structure different spaces meaning that we ‘fit in’. By
thinking of the formation of the self in this way, it also avoids the
problem of the apriori self e where we are born with a unique
essence, or as Hochschild puts it, an ‘inner jewel’ (1983: 34) that
makes us who we are and enables us to be autonomous. For
Bourdieu, this is unnecessary: he explains the formation of the self
as being socialized into the ways of game playing from birth
through our habitus and position in the field so that we develop a
‘feel for the game’ (Bourdieu, 1990: 67). Playing games involves
fitting in with the ‘right ways of being and doing’ (Bourdieu, 1986,
1990: 511) in certain social spaces. This practice of fitting in
convincingly, and having the right habitus, involves (amongst other
things) managing our emotions. Having a feel for the game Bour-
dieu describes as ‘the sense of the imminent future of the game the
sense of the direction (sens) of the history of the game that gives
the game its sense’ (1990: 82). How well we play social games
depends on our embodied history (habitus), the positionwe hold in
the field, and the different resources (material and embodied
capital) we have at our disposal to assist us (Bourdieu, 1984).
That said, it is important that the habitus is not viewed as a
concept which portrays the individual as a cultural dupe. Whilst the
individual is immersed in the social world generally partaking in
practices that are familiar to their habitus, there are significant
moments when the individual is not at ease and it is these points
that produce critical reflexivity for the individual. Not being
familiar with the game can lead to feelings of being out of place e
like a fish out of water (Bourdieu, 1990). Put another way, this can
feel like we do not know what to do, how to think or feel, in a
certain situation (see Addison, 2016) and it is in these critical mo-
ments that change and agency happen. However, it is this feeling of
being uneasy with our surroundings, like we don't fit in, that
Hochschild mis-identifies as a splitting of the self e a false self then
where we put on a performance of what we think is expected of us
(I was not being myself). However, this feeling of unease and
conscious performance, I would argue, is connected to an aware-
ness of a lack of knowledge of how to act and feel in a situation. This
emotional dissonance then is not an argument to support the idea
of a false self, but rather indicates a feeling of being out of place in a
certain social space and around certain people.
9. Conclusions
It has been my intention here to show that feeling out of place,
or not being ourselves in certain social situations, is not down to a
dichotomy between a real and false self as Hochschild tries to un-
successfully set up. Rather, I have argued here that this feeling of
‘not being myself’ arises because we do not possess the required
knowledge dispositions or embodied practice, or have the right
embodied history, in order to act comfortably in certain situations
e thereforewe are reflexive of our social position and feel uneasy as
if we are not ourselves. Instead of the idea of a real self constrained
by feeling rules, I have argued that individuals use their embodied
histories as a way of understanding and making sense of theprevailing dominant symbolic structures. Acquisition of this
knowledge of how things ought to be done is sedimented as dis-
positions over time, creating a personal history, which is then
drawn upon to strategize future practice. This means then that
there is no need to argue, as Hochschild does, about what version of
the self is ‘real’ andwhat is ‘false’: fundamentally all aspects of one's
self and performances are real.
Some employees sense that their embodied histories don't fit
well within social space. These people may find that they repeat-
edly have to adjust their practices, even when they feel uncom-
fortable, in order to fit in with a legitimated value system
structuring how they ‘ought’ to be (see Bathmaker et al., 2013; Reay
et al., 2009). Then again, those who find themselves feeling ‘out of
place’ (Reay et al., 2009) may subvert structured feeling rules in the
workplace, they may develop alternate ways of fitting in within or
without the rules, they may collude with colleagues and share
anger and humour as a strategy for dealing with exploitations of
their emotional labour. The concept of embodied history works
much better with these ideas of emotion management then than
Hochschild's idea of the real self. It has explanatory power without
theorising performances as ‘false’. I argue that it is more appro-
priate to critically consider why acting a certain way, and managing
emotion, in a particular space can seem odd and make us feel ill at
ease. I have suggested here that our embodied histories can feel out
of place in the workplace because we may be used to a different
way of doing things in our day-to-day lives (see Addison, 2012;
2016). The workplace can exploit our ability to shape ourselves
into someone we are told we ought to be, and this can hold us in a
state of being ill at ease. And so, entering a space that has domi-
nating structured feelings rules which are different to our own
embodied feeling rules obliges us to manage and display our feel-
ings, perhaps in uncomfortable and unfamiliar ways. However, I
would again reiterate that this is not evidence of a real and false
self, but rather highlights the self-conscious feelings we may have
in certain situations and around certain people.
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